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A new Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) began on
14 February 2000 and is expected to end on 8 December
2000 in Nice. The reason behind this fresh round of
treaty re-negotiation is that the last IGC, which ended in
Amsterdam in the small hours of 18 June 1997, did not
finish its business. Several key questions of institutional
reform which are considered essential prerequisites for
enlargement were simply put off.
Unless these “left-overs” are now resolved at Nice,
the whole enlargement process will suffer a serious
blow. There must not be any further postponement of
preparatory steps. Yet the depth of the differences has
raised questions as to whether a satisfactory deal (or any
deal) can be reached, while the terms in which the
debate is conducted have caused concern. Some fear
there will be insufficient movement over fundamental
issues of the extension of qualified-majority voting and
the easing of “flexibility” provisions, without both of
which the European Union may face a threat of paralysis
in the future. At the same time, the IGC arguments over
the representation of different-sized states are taking
place amid a more general “slide” towards intergovern-
mentalism. This has created concern among smaller
states that the Community process is in danger of being
replaced by pure inter-state bargaining on the basis of
relative power. This trend should not be exaggerated in
reality, but the fact remains that the spectre of a directoire
of big states is now openly cited in public discourse.
This article first presents the background to the IGC
2000 and the scope of the agenda. It then outlines the
principal options and arguments regarding each of the
four main points under consideration, and looks at the
prospects as of September 2000 for the results of the
IGC. Finally it highlights some broader concerns about
how the institutional debate has developed, concentrating
of the question of size, and considers what might be the
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most appropriate outcome of the IGC in the light of the
need to ensure coherence and solidarity in an ever larger
Union among the peoples of Europe.
The Background
The unanswered questions in 1997 were clear. The
Commission is presently composed of at least one
national from each Member State, with the five most
populous countries having two each. If this system were
to be continued in an EU of 27, the Commission would
have 33 members. There was a consensus that this
number would be excessive. Yet if the five big countries
were to “give up” their second Commissioner, they
demanded to be “compensated” by more proportional
representation in the Council, in which the weighting of
votes is skewed in favour of the smaller states.1 However,
there was no agreement as to how this should be changed.
The two questions remained linked, it being somehow
overlooked in the struggle that the Commission is
supposed to be independent. The result was a “Protocol
on the institutions with the prospect of enlargement of
the European Union” which states in its first article that:
“At the date of entry into force of the first enlargement
of the Union … the Commission shall comprise one
national of each of the Member states, provided that, by
that date, the weighting of votes in the Council has been
modified, whether by re-weighting or by dual majority,
in a manner acceptable to all Member States…” The
second article provides that “At least one year before the
membership of the European Union exceeds twenty a
new Intergovernmental
Conference shall be
convened to carry out a
comprehensive review
of the provisions of the
Treaties on the com-
position and function-
ing of the institutions.”
Belgium, France and
Italy also insisted on the
Conference taking note
of their Declaration to the effect that reinforcement of
the institutions was “an indispensable condition for the
conclusion of the first accession negotiations”, in
particular a “significant extension of recourse to
qualified-majority voting”.
Why were the decisions put off? The institutional
questions had been left to the end and there had been
little time to prepare a compromise. As the IGC ran into
the early hours, some issues of particular sensitivity
came up. For example, Belgium had reacted badly to the
suggestion that The Netherlands, with nearly 16 million
people, should receive one more vote than Belgium,
which has around 10 million but has traditionally had
equal voting weight. One reason for putting off a decision
appears to have been the possibility of now also
discussing differentiation between France and Germany,
given the latter’s increase in population to over 80
million compared to France’s 59 million.
It seems to have been considered better just to drop
the matter than to press on. On the one hand it did not
seem sufficiently urgent to take a decision. Enlargement
was over the horizon, and at that time only five new
members were ostensibly expected in the first wave. On
the other hand, difficult issues had to be resolved
without delay, which could be affected by additional
problems over institutional matters. The decision as to
which countries would join the single currency had to be
taken in the first half of 1998. Delicate discussions were
also imminent over the financial implications of
enlargement, particularly reform of the common
agricultural policy and of the structural funds.
The Agenda
Only after the launch of the single currency in January
1999 and the completion of the Agenda 2000 negotia-
tions in Berlin in March 1999 was there any movement
even in agreeing the agenda for the new IGC.
Proposals for a broad agenda, including strong
pressure from the European Parliament, having been
repeatedly rejected, there are four main points under
consideration. The Cologne European Council of June
1999 decided that the IGC should examine the size and
composition of the Commision, the weighting of votes
in the Council and the possible extension of qualified-
majority voting (QMV) in the Council, as well as “other
necessary amendments to the Treaties arising as regards
the European institutions in connection with the above
issues and in implementing the Treaty of Amsterdam”.
This was confirmed by
the Helsinki European
Council of 10-11 De-
cember 1999, although
it was agreed that the
Portuguese Presidency
“may propose addi-
tional issues to be taken
on the agenda of the
Conference”. The
European Council in
Feira on 19-20 June 2000 duly agreed that the new
provisions on closer cooperation should also be
considered “while respecting the need for coherence
and solidarity in an enlarged Union”.
The  “other” institutional issues which could be
covered at Nice include implementation of the ceiling of
700 Members of the European Parliament introduced
by the Amsterdam Treaty, as well as the possible
extension of co-decision (for some delegations as a
necessary corollary of QMV); amendments concerning
the competences and procedures of the Court of Justice
and Court of First Instance; the numbers of members of
the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee
of the Regions; and a variety of other articles which
different delegations consider “necessary”.
The two parallel processes taking place concerning
a Charter of Fundamental Rights and the European
Security and Defence Policy may also converge with
the IGC if any treaty amendments are proposed.2
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The Arguments
The Size and Composition of the Commission
If maintenance of the present system is discarded, there
are two options.
The first is to have one national from each Member
State. In favour of this it is argued that all countries
would permanently have a visible link with the
Commission, which would help boost popular
identification with the institution. Also, smaller countries
– which continue to believe that a strong and independent
Commission is an essential guarantee of their interests
in the face of the larger countries – would feel assured
that their positions will be taken equally into account in
defining policies and controlling implementation, and
that the Commission does play an independent role.
Against, it is stressed that a Commission of this nature
would have greater problems of internal coordination,
because of the greater division of responsibilities, and
face difficulties and sensitivities over the distribution of
portfolios. Some internal hierarchy would appear
inevitable, but the smaller countries in September reacted
strongly against proposals to increase the number of
Vice-Presidents from two to perhaps six and strengthen
their powers, suspecting that by one means or another
these positions would be dominated by the larger
countries. From another point of view, such a
Commission would tend to be another intergovernmental
assembly rather than an independent college, which
would actually weaken its ability to act autonomously in
defence of smaller countries’ interests.
The second option is to “cap” the Commission at a
figure lower than the
number of Member
States, perhaps at the
present 20 Members.
Proponents of this op-
tion argue that the Com-
mission would thus be
more efficient, which
would boost its legiti-
macy. It would also be
visibly de-nationalised,
which would strengthen
its credibility as an
impartial European body. National equality could be
assured if the system of rotation by which the Member
States would nominate the Commissions were strictly
“size-neutral”. Acceptance of such a system by some
larger states, however, has seemed difficult. There have
been clear signs that some would not be willing to
renounce having one Commissioner on a permanent
basis.
The Weighting of Votes
The first question here is whether the share of votes3
should be made more directly proportional to Member
States’ populations at all.
Those in favour imply that, at the present stage of
institutional development of the Union, it is inappropriate
to argue simply that Parliament should represent the
citizens while the Council represents the states. Even if
this were not the case, moreover, there is no a priori
reason to prefer the American model of equal
representation of States to the German system of
weighted bloc votes for Länder governments. Efficiency
would not be served if decisions could be blocked by
votes representing too small a minority of the overall
population: in an EU of 27 this could drop to 10% if
nothing is done.4 Legitimacy requires that decisions
should not be adopted by coalitions representing barely
a simple majority of the total population: at present the
minimum share of population which can be represented
in a winning coalition has dropped to around 58%, and
this figure should not, it is said, be lowered.
Those arguing against greater proportionality tend
not only to cite the different representational functions
of Council and Parliament; they argue also that the
Community, as an exceptionally strong union between
states of very different size and between very
heterogeneous societies, must give an unusually high
priority to the protection of minorities, rather than the
rule of majorities. Some would add that it may be no bad
thing for decision-making to be a bit more complicated
if this would increase both consensus and effective
implementation of what is adopted.5
The second question is how any changes should be
made.
One option is a re-weighting of votes in favour of the
larger countries. In its favour, this would raise the
population share of a minimum winning coalition in a
way which is easy to
manage and to under-
stand. It is also argued
that it would be the
clearest means to “com-
pensate” those States
which lose their second
Commissioner.6
Against, it is pointed
out that the stronger the
re-weighting of votes
towards direct pro-
portionality, the more
likely it is that winning coalitions would not represent a
majority of states; and that to accentuate the formal
differentiation between states qua states would weaken
solidarity. Also, unless some fairly artificial clusters
were maintained, this would open up sensitive questions
of differentiation between traditionally equal pairs of
countries.
The second option is a dual majority. In this case,
decisions would require both that a majority of votes
should be cast in favour (either left at the current
weighting or, in a more radical approach, reduced to one
vote for each state) and that these votes represented a
majority of the population (either a special majority of
perhaps 60% or, in the more radical approach, a simple
majority). Those in favour argue that this system would
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reflect more accurately the double legitimacy of the EU
as a union of states and a union of peoples. It would be
more likely to produce legitimacy of the system as a
whole, as opposed to individual countries’ assessments
of their relative representation. Those opposed assert
that it would be more difficult to manage and understand.
Qualified-Majority Voting
The perspective of enlargement has somewhat eased
acceptance of extending QMV, since a unanimity
requirement in a Union of 27 or more countries clearly
threatens to paralyse decision-making. However, deep
differences have remained. There was consensus by
June that “a number of constitutional and quasi-consti-
tutional issues intrins-
ically call for unani-
mity”.7 These included
four categories: prov-
isions expressly to be
adopted by the Member
States in accordance
with their respective
constitutional rules
(e.g. treaty revision,
new accessions etc.);
“quasi-constitutional”
provisions (e.g. number
of Commissioners, Judges and Advocates-General;
amendment of Commission proposals; committee
procedure etc.); “provisions allowing derogations from
normal Treaty rules” (e.g. measures constituting a step
back in movement of capital or in transport); and
“provisions in respect of which the rule of unanimity
ensures consistency between internal and external decis-
ions”.
The Portuguese Presidency also proposed to the
Feira European Council a list of 39 provisions to be
examined for straightforward transition to QMV on the
grounds that they had a close link to the internal market
or with other areas already under QMV, and a series of
provisions for which a move to QMV could only be
considered for specific aspects.8 However, countries
differed strongly as to which areas should remain under
unanimity. The most sensitive fields under discussion
were taxation and social security.
Closer Cooperation
Several Member States urged changes in the provisions
on closer cooperation, to facilitate the adoption of future
“flexibility” arrangements by which deeper integration
can be pursued in particular areas without the
participation of all countries.
The proposals mainly aim at relaxing the “enabling
clauses” introduced at Amsterdam – that is, the general
conditions and procedures contained in the Treaty of
European Union, and the specific provisions included
for the European Community and in Police and Judicial
Cooperation in Criminal Matters. First, the right of veto
should be removed. At present the Council may decide
by qualified majority to authorise closer cooperation.
However, if any Member State declares that it opposes
the authorisation “for important and stated reasons of
national policy”, the Council may by qualified majority
refer the proposal to the European Council for a
unanimous decision. This “emergency brake”, it is
argued, should go. Second, the minimum number of
States participating in a proposed arrangement should
be reduced from the majority now stipulated, perhaps to
one-third. Proposals have also been made regarding the
Second Pillar.
The need for change has been questioned on three
basic grounds. The provisions have not been used since
the Treaty of Amsterdam came into force, so it is hard
to see how changes
should be evaluated.
The conditions should
be kept strict to avoid
future fragmentation,
while the progressive
extension of QMV
should make it possible
to advance in inte-
gration without closer
cooperation arrange-
ments. And the wrong
message would be sent
to the applicant states.
Defenders of flexibility respond that the aim is
precisely to avoid separate arrangements being reached
outside the Treaty and that, in the words of the Report to
Feira, “closer cooperation must not be seen as a factor
of fragmentation or dilution but, on the contrary, as a
factor of integration insofar as it sets more ambitious
objectives to be shared by all members”.9 The negative
result in the Danish referendum on entry into the single
currency on 28 September will probably intensify
pressure for greater flexibility.
The Prospects
As of September 2000, it seemed most probable that the
principle of one Commissioner per Member State would
be confirmed, due to the firm defence of this position by
the smaller Member States. There could be new
provisions regarding hierarchy within the Commission,
as part of proposals to ensure coordination, despite the
smaller countries’ concerns. The issue remained open
as to how far the five countries which lost their second
Commissioner would have to be “compensated” in the
Council. With regard to the weighting of votes, the re-
weighting option appeared to have more support than a
dual majority, but agreement on numbers remained
elusive. It also seemed likely that there would be some
extension of QMV, although it remained unclear how
many cases would concern major policy areas in the
end, rather than relatively minor questions of procedure.
In the case of closer cooperation the outcome promised
to be an end to the veto and possibly some easing of
conditions regarding the number of Member States
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which had to be party to proposed flexibility arrange-
ments. Other issues would be included and could prove
important elements in reaching an overall deal at Nice.
Yet the difficulties have not seemed to lessen.
Moreover, the possibility that a fresh IGC would be
convoked after Nice – in order to tackle broader
constitutional questions such as treaty reorganisation
and clarification of competences – could reduce the
pressure to find compromises.
The Concerns
Many of the concerns expressed around Europe about
the IGC have related to what is not on the agenda. Yet
there are also various reasons to be concerned about
what is being discussed and how it is being treated.
Are These the Right Problems?
The extension of qualified-majority voting and the issue
of closer cooperation are clearly central and urgent
issues for the future of European integration. There has
been some questioning, however, as to whether the
issues concerning representation in the institutions are
the most important, or even the real, problems to be
addressed?
Relative size is not a determining factor in day-to-
day European decision-making. More or less stable
coalitions are formed on
a variety of issues – trade
policy, agriculture, bud-
get, environment – but
not by size. Small coun-
tries simply do not gang
up against big countries
(or vice versa) on any
substantive issue. The
impact of different vot-
ing weights is far from
clear. The Commission
has carried out a study
in which the alternative
systems of re-weighting
and dual majority were
applied to Council legis-
lative decisions in the
three years before the
Amsterdam Treaty, only
to discover that not one of those decisions would have
been altered.10 Even the importance of voting itself can
be exaggerated. Governments are outvoted, but much
less than the formal provisions might suggest. Although
unanimity is not the rule, the search for consensus is still
the norm.
In addition, the fuss about majority voting and
relative weighting comes at a time when decisions are
increasingly taken by means other than the classic
Community, or “Monnet”, method even within the
Community system. New instruments of “open
coordination”, such as guidelines, benchmarking and
peer review, are increasingly being favoured in place of
legislation. New patterns of execution through
independent bodies and non-hierarchical networks are
common in policy management. Is not managing these
new forms of European governance more important
than retouching Monnet?
Moreover, it is often pointed out that the major
advances in the European Union in the 1990s have come
from intergovernmental initiatives (such as the UK-
French proposals since 1998 in the field of security and
defence), and that the European Council has become the
motor of integration rather than the Commission, or the
Parliament.
Finally, it is not clear either that the main problems
of institutional reform are due to enlargement or that the
main challenges of enlargement are to do with the
institutions.
Size Does Seem to Matter
Yet the question of size does seem to have become an
issue of principle, and even of emotion, affecting the
broader debate over the future of European integration.
It is not a matter of questioning the importance of
leadership by larger Member States. This has always
been an essential element in the process of integration
and will remain so in the future. And the “big-small”
question has certainly not been absent in the past. Since
the 1950s the distribu-
tion of votes has always
been based on explicit
equations about the
relative ability of dif-
ferent combinations of
larger and smaller
states to out-vote each
other.11 Until the 1980s
the situation could be
well summed-up as
being that “no more
than one big Member
State could be out-
voted, but that the big
Member States could
not by themselves out-
vote the smaller Mem-
ber States.”12 However,
following the 1966
Luxembourg compromise, majority voting did not in
fact take place until the 1980s, which made the whole
thing rather academic. When voting did become an
accepted practice, national governments and parliaments
quickly (albeit belatedly) began to focus on the impli-
cations of weighting and to find some problematic
aspects.
For a while, however, it was still felt that the “big-
small” question would largely be diluted by a system in
which the Commission and the Court would protect the
interests of the weak. The Union was only beginning to
become involved in sensitive areas of politics and
security. And the kind of massive enlargement agreed at
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Helsinki in December 1999 was still unthinkable. By
2000 things had come together in a way which
qualitatively changed the terms of the debate.
First, this Intergovernmental Conference is taking
place in the context, and somewhat in the spirit, of a
“slide towards intergovernmentalism”. This is not the
same as the trend towards new forms of governance
mentioned above. It is a principled belief that major
decisions should be reached by agreement between the
Member States, whether this is preferred in a loose
association or a tighter confederation of nation-states.
The current drift in this direction is partly a reflection
of the low credibility of the Community institutions
(although the Court has escaped the public eye in most
countries), which hit bottom in 1999. The Commission
has received most of the
criticism, with the resig-
nation of the Santer
Commission providing
a focal point for public
attention. Yet the Parlia-
ment is also challeng-
ed. Average turnout at
European elections has
fallen in each of the five
direct elections held
since 1979, reaching a
low of 49% in 1999.
The Parliament showed
some institutional mus-
cle to the public in the
confrontation with the
Santer Commission,
perhaps to some short-
term advantage. Yet,
because people do not appear to discriminate between
the institutions and because the Commission remains
the Parliament’s long-term ally in the Community
process, Commission-bashing is not in the Parliament’s
interests – and the Parliament could also do more to
improve its own image.
Second, the larger Member States have simulta-
neously manifested a sort of “Lilliput complex” – a fear
of being tied down by a host of small states. No sooner
had the Helsinki European Council agreed in December
1999 that negotiations should be conducted with 12
applicant states and that Turkey was now recognised as
a candidate country, than a fresh burst of political
anxiety was heard among the Member States about the
need to ensure the possibility of flexibility in the future.
The consequence has been an increasingly open
interest among some larger states in a more
intergovernmental kind of Union in which they would
be in control. The idea of institutionalising a special role
for the larger states is not new even within the
Community. Five of the eight Advocates-General of the
Court, for example, are reserved for the Big Five while
the others are rotated. It is even clearer in the area of
foreign policy and security, most notably with the
“Contact Group” for former Yugoslavia in which
European participation was limited to France, Germany,
Italy and the UK.
Yet the idea becomes worrying to many people
concerned about the future solidarity and coherence of
the Union when it is linked more systematically to
intergovernmentalism (as in the UK proposals in the
autumn of 2000 for a radical reform involving a much-
strengthened European Council) or to both intergovern-
mentalism and flexibility. This could be noted in the
reactions to the varying expressions of the idea heard so
far during 2000. German Foreign Minister Joschka
Fischer on 12 May thus proposed that an “avant-garde”
group of states should conclude a new framework
treaty. He explicitly argued that “Initially, enhanced
cooperation means no-
thing more than in-
creased intergovern-
mentalization under
pressure from the facts
and the shortcomings
of the ‘Monnet
method’.” French Pre-
sident Jacques Chirac
made his own offering
on 27 June, proposing
closer cooperation be-
tween a “pioneer
group” of states around
the Franco-German
tandem, which would
have its own small
secretariat, apart from
the Community institu-
tions.
These ideas have, not surprisingly, provoked fears
of a de facto directoire of the larger Member States, in
particular of Germany, France and the United Kingdom
– a sort of new Concert of Europe. And all of this has
coincided with the sanctions on Austria, which were
widely seen (independently of feelings about the
Freedom Party) as the Member States pushing a small
country around.
In this context it is not hard to see why there is unease
about the insistence by larger Member States on having
a strong re-weighting of votes in their favour in the
Council in addition to the proportional representation in
the Parliament, while the Commission’s role is
questioned.
Conclusions
Views as to what precisely should be done in the IGC
depend crucially on what kind of European Union one
wants (and/or believes is likely). Here differences are
inevitable and, let it be emphasised, desirable. My own
proposal and preference for the institutional points
under consideration at the IGC would be a package deal
consisting of the following basic elements:
• a Commission “capped” permanently at 20 Members
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with a rotation system not defined according to size
– not because of the supposed problem of finding
work for more than 20 people but because the
Commission would thus finally be denationalised,
which is a vital element in the whole European
construction;
• a “stand-still” in real terms on the weighting of votes
in the Council, meaning that the current system
should be “stretched” only so far as is needed to
ensure that the minimum share of total population
represented by a possible winning coalition under
QMV should be around 60%, taking EU 2713 as a
reference population, and with the minimum possible
extra differentiation being introduced in the visible
relation between States (i.e. the degree to which the
public will perceive non-equality);
• the establishment of QMV and co-decision as the
basic rule for all legislative acts, but the retention of
unanimity for all constitutional and “quasi-
constitutional” pro-
visions; and
• an increase in the
proportionality of
representation in the
European Parlia-
ment in the context
of implementing the
700-MEP ceiling.
This would be, in my
view, the most approp-
riate solution for a
European Union which
will remain a union of
states as well as of
peoples, in which inter-
governmental bargain-
ing must be diluted and checked by strong European
institutions, and minority protection must take
precedence over simple majority rule.
At the same time, closer cooperation should be
eased in order to ensure that it takes place within the
Union structures.
The experience of the IGC so far has illustrated the
continuing difficulties in overcoming the problem of
size, which make it all the harder to reach agreement
over the fundamental issues at stake.
The big countries’ apparent interest in simulta-
neously ending the smaller countries’ right to have a
national permanently in the Commission (or at least
“fixing” their own dominance in an internal hierarchy)
and in having a major increase in their own relative
weight in the Council, seems guaranteed to provoke
deep opposition from the smaller countries.
It is partly a question of substance. There is a
genuine and understandable fear in smaller countries of
being dominated as states by an intergovernmental
directoire, or absorbed as populations into a European
polity in which they would be permanently marginalised.
It is also a problem of presentation. The governments
of the big countries may feel obliged partly for domestic
reasons to insist on “compensation” and “restoration”
of their relative weight – particularly France, Germany
and the United Kingdom, in all three of which less than
50% of the population now supports membership of the
EU.14 Yet the governments of the small countries have
public opinions and concerned parliaments too. If the
results of the IGC are all seen as concessions to the
larger countries the governments may have great
difficulty in selling them at home. As the Danish refer-
endum of 28 September has again shown, people can
say “No”.
It is vital not to give the peoples of Europe – both in
the present Member States and, even more so, in the
applicant countries – the feeling that relative size is the
only thing that matters. At a time of low public support
for European integration and of delicate feelings
surrounding the “negotiations” with the applicants, it
seems all the more
essential to insist that
the underlying princi-
ples of European (re-)
unification are still less
to do with relative
power and much more
to do with overall soli-
darity. The European
Community was cre-
ated to overcome the
power-balancing sys-
tems of the past. A
renewal of Community
institutions is certainly
needed. A return to
Congress diplomacy is
not.
________________
NOTES
1 At present France, Germany, Italy and the UK each have
10 votes; Spain has 8; Belgium, Greece, Netherlands
and Portugal 5; Austria and Sweden 4; Denmark, Finland
and Ireland 3; and Luxembourg 2.
2 See the articles by Laura Carrasco and Simon Duke
respectively in this number.
3 It is beyond the scope of this paper to address the
relevance of voting power analyses which, in different
ways, set out to demonstrate the undeniable point that
real voting power, which derives mainly from the ability
to shape the formation of winning coalitions, is not the
same as relative voting share.
4 The French Presidency’s first Note on the subject stresses
with precision that the current minimum population
share which could be represented by a blocking minority
is 12.83%; and that this could fall to 10.50% in a Union
of 27 if nothing is done and to 11.62% in a dual-majority
system. One of the starting points, it argues, is that this
percentage must on no account be allowed to fall.
The European Community was created
to overcome the power-balancing
systems of the past. A renewal of
Community institutions is certainly
needed. A return to Congress
diplomacy is not.http://eipa.nl Eipascope 2000/3 9
(Presidency Note, IGC 2000 – Weighting of Votes,
CONFER 4754/00. Brussels, 3 July 2000 p. 2)
5 As Madison observed when defending the equality of
State representation in the US Senate: “as the larger
States will always be able, by their power over the
supplies, to defeat unreasonable exertions of this
prerogative of the lesser States, and as the facility and
excess of lawmaking seem to be the diseases to which
our governments are most liable, it is not impossible that
this part of the Constitution may be more convenient in
practice than it appears to many in contemplation”.
James Madison, Alexander Hamilton and John Jay, The
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Abstract
Although one of the main issues which is being discussed by the EU and the candidate countries is the request of the latter
for a date for their accession to the Union, this article argues that, in a rather paradoxical way, the process of enlargement
would be facilitated if the EU and the candidates were less concerned about the date itself and more keen to focus their
efforts on identifying arrangements that would ensure that the benefits of enlargement are spread widely so that all
Member States support the accession of new members.
It is also argued in this article that there are other issues which can have a significant impact on the process of
enlargement. The candidates should decide what they want fixed above all: the date of entry, the derogations they wish
to have at the negotiations or the entry criteria? The analysis in this article suggests that they should aim for the latter
because vague criteria have a much greater potential to stall the enlargement process on both sides. For its part, the EU
should begin identifying the pre-commitments that can be made by the Member States now in order to smooth the process
of enlargement later on. The Feira European Council, therefore, has served to reveal where the problem really lies in that
process.
The request to fix the date of the next enlargement
Unlike several of its recent predecessors, the Feira
European Council of June 2000 appeared to be of little
significance to the process of enlargement of the
European Union because it did not resolve a key issue
in that process. For several months before the Feira
Council, the countries that had applied for membership
of the Union asked EU leaders to fix a date for their
accession to the EU. In the end, no such date was fixed
at Feira. The response of the EU was terse. It was not
possible to fix a date before the candidate countries
could demonstrate that they were fully prepared to
assume all the obligations of membership.3
The purpose of this article is to explain why, in a
rather paradoxical way, the process of enlargement
would be facilitated if the EU and the candidates were
less concerned about the date itself and more keen to
focus their efforts on identifying arrangements that
would ensure that the benefits of enlargement are spread
so that all Member States support it. The preoccupation
with the date of the next enlargement has diverted
attention from other, potentially more serious problems.
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